A lot has been written about Kamikaze. Right and not so right. But what is missing is an answer to the question "Why kamikaze?" - The hopeless war situation answers this only incompletely, because it leads to the further question "Why didn't they surrender when victory was no longer possible?" - Also largely unanswered is the background that led to the attack on Pearl Harbor, to the war in the Pacific.

This article aims to show how everything came to understand Kamikaze. - The true story.

The deeper reason for this expansion policy lay far back. It began in the 16th century. Japan, religiously firmly anchored in Zen Buddhism and Shintoism, initially paid no attention to Christian missionary attempts, but then realized that Christian teachings were in stark contradiction to its own. Japan, as a land of the sun created by the sun goddess Amaterasu, embodied on earth by her son, the Tenno, already had a god through him. Also, "love your enemies" was not compatible with bushi-do, the Samurai code of honor, which had already become firmly established as part of Japanese popular culture. Persecution of Christians and subsequent rigorous isolation from the outside world were the result, in order to exclude non-Japanese influences. The 1854 opening to commerce forced by Commodore Matthew C. Perry through "gunboat diplomacy" was a shock that lingered long afterward.  Especially as European powers successively established themselves in the form of colonies on the mainland and in Southeast Asia. At some point, the Japanese feared, Japan would also be occupied, its ancient culture displaced by the completely alien Western way of life. The solution could only be military rearmament. Victory in the Russo-Japanese War, February 8, 1904-September 5, 1905, seemed to confirm that rearmament was the appropriate means to gain Japan the respect it deserved. Moreover, as the victorious power, it had received the extensive, formerly German colonies in the Pacific. As a result, Japan, since the tenno was averse to any political activity, turned into a pure military dictatorship, in which the state media and educational system ensured that the idealized samurai virtues were internalized. Dissenters were dealt with by the "Kempetai" secret state police. As a result of this indoctrination, unconditional obedience, death for victory and the exclusion of surrender were natural virtues for a soldier as the legitimate successor to a Samurai.

In the course of the surrender negotiations, Hirohito had to renounce his divinity, but he remained Tenno and head of state of Japan, because General Douglas MacArthur had recognized that Japan needed a Tenno, if reconstruction and democratization of Japan should succeed. This argues against the Tenno's involvement in the war.

• The US Army under General Douglas MacArthur across New Guinea to the Philippines, thence north with US Navy and Marine Corps.

• The US Navy with the attached Marine Corps had assigned the Western Pacific up to Hokkaido level, according to Admiral Nimitz's original plan across the Central Pacific to the Philippines, from there together with the US Army to Japan.

In the Philippines, on the other hand, Japanese rearguard action was to continue until the end of the war, causing many civilian casualties.

 The most important stations in brief:

People talk about Kamikaze missions and Kamikaze pilots, but in Japan "Kamikaze" was understood differently and was not used for such a kind of mission. "Kamikaze" was a historical-mythical term deeply rooted in the Japanese consciousness, which goes back to two typhoons that had prevented two Mongol invasion attempts - which Japan had nothing to oppose - in the 13th century. This gave rise to the myth that when Japan, as the land of the sun goddess, was in danger of being conquered by a superior enemy power, a new great storm of the gods - "kamikaze" - would sweep away the attacker. "Kamikaze" thus referred only to an unspecified rescue from the greatest need. For the later organized operation, the Japanese Navy used the term "Tokubetsu Kōgekita" (special attack), in short "Tokko Tai" or "Tokko", in the army "Shimbu Tai".

Sacrificing oneself to achieve victory was nothing fundamentally new.*  Already during the war, special names for this had developed in the Japanese Navy. Just as there were special names for the elaborate sword strokes of a samurai, an exact designation of the type of mission was equally important for the military communique and the family.

A mission on October 21, 1944 (photo left) had to be canceled due to bad weather. On the 25th the time had come. Six A6M Zeros (units "Asahi" and "Kikusui") with four Zeros as escorts took off from Davao on Mindoro; the unit "Shikishima" under Lieutenant Seki with five self-sacrificial aircraft and four escort fighters followed some time later from Mabalacat. The target was the escort carrier units "Taffy 1" and - "3". The first ship to be hit was the "Santee" (CVE-29) at 07:40, and the "Suwanee" (CVE-27) at 08:oo. Both had significant personnel losses from burn injuries, but remained afloat. Seki's group hit "Taffy 3" and scored hits on "Kitkun Bay" (CVE-71), "White Plains" (CVE-66), and "Fanshaw Bay" (CVE-70), but these were relatively insignificant, as was later shown. "St. Lo" (CVE-63), however, was different. A Zero, already trailing a plume of smoke, according to legend piloted by Seki, first released its bomb and then struck amidships at 11:35. Aircraft and ammunition caught fire in the hangar, and the "St Lo" exploded a short time later in a spectacular cloud of fire (photo left).

When the escort fighters*, including the ace of aces, Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, brought home the news of several aircraft carriers sunk, the spell was broken. A single brave pilot was able to destroy an aircraft carrier along with its planes. Such a mission was in keeping with best samurai tradition and made sense. A new wind of the gods, kamikaze, was born. Volunteers came out in droves, some signing their names in their own blood to lend weight to their message. A poster with the Tenno's praise for the courage of the pilots (whose death he had regretted) did the rest. The naval air force could therefore afford to refuse married people and first-born sons. Nothing better illuminates the situation than the story preserved in the "Yasukuni" shrine of Lieutenant Fuji, an instructor whose wife drowned herself and their two children so that he could fulfill his heart's desire to be allowed to fly such a mission. However, in the Japanese Navy, at least in the early days, it was quite natural and not at all dishonorable to return from a flight if one had not found a target (e.g., because of bad weather over the fleet).

Those who were not assigned to the first deployment of Group 201 perished in subsequent deployments from Formosa (Taiwan).

Volunteer registration did not mean immediate assignment. One had to wait until one was assigned. This waiting time was an opportunity for some to prepare themselves in peace and quiet, to write letters and to take care of last things. Food, drink and other pleasures were provided. For those, on the other hand, who in the meantime had asked themselves why they had actually enlisted and those who had only been detached, the waiting time dragged on as an agonizingly long ordeal (in the words of one survivor: "It was like waiting for the electric chair"). No matter what one's opinion was, one had to show attitude and no weakness even during the last walk. The order to go into action was therefore experienced as a kind of salvation. What moved the individual can only be gleaned from the surviving farewell letters to a very limited extent. They were subject to censorship and had to be patriotic.

It is not known whether the launch of the first "Tokko" machines of Group 201 was associated with a ceremony. What is certain, however, is a ritualized procedure during later missions, combined with a common song, gladly that of the soon falling cherry blossoms. After lining up, a senior officer gave a motivational speech in honor of the deployment, then everyone received their "hakimachi" headband with the rising sun and a bowl of sake. Walking to the plane, one showed poise, what one felt was a private matter. Waving to the departing pilots one last time was a matter of course. After an appropriate waiting period due to possible returnees as a result of engine damage, the departed were officially declared dead*. The parents received a small wooden box in which their loved one had previously placed a lock of hair, parts of fingernails or other objects. The final step was posthumous promotion by two levels.

Amazingly, it was neither the impact nor the bomb that could sink a ship, but the fuel set on fire. The hole created by the impact was relatively insignificant because the wings were torn off. The bomb carried had a greater effect in comparison. Especially if it was triggered before impact and caused a second hole. In the first case, the ship usually remained afloat; in the second, it could possibly be enough to sink smaller ships. The real danger, however, was the fuel that caught fire, which was controllable in itself but could have a devastating effect on aircraft carriers. In the hangar below the flight deck were parked aircraft fully loaded on ammunition and refueled, with bombs and torpedoes stored on the walls. If these exploded, the fate of a lightly built escort carrier was sealed. So were the escort carriers CVE-79 Ommaney Bay on 4 January 1945 and CVE-75 "Bismarck Sea" on 21 February 1945, but they were the last to be lost to enemy action. Subsequent fleet carriers were only more or less damaged. Such attacks were ineffective on the British aircraft carriers, which had armored decks ("Sailors man your brooms").

That an experienced pilot could destroy an aircraft carrier with two bombs from a Yokusuka D4Y "Judy" dive bomber even without self-sacrifice was demonstrated in the case of the CVL-23 "Princeton" on 24.10.1044.

Lieutenant "Masakazu Ohta" (also known as "Shoiji Ota"), a transport aircraft pilot, was not the only one to realize early on that the Naval Air Force was no longer capable of providing decisive countermeasures to the ever-growing number of U.S. aircraft carriers. But it was he who approached the University of Tokyo's Aeronautics Experimental Laboratory with a proposal to build a solid-fuel rocket-propelled, explosives-laden flying machine that could be manually piloted into a ship. There they saw potential, drew up rough plans, and passed them on to the Yokosuka Works Experimental Laboratory. The result was the MXY-7 "Ohka," outwardly like a torpedo with small wings and tail. Loaded with 1.2 tons of explosives in the nose, it was to be brought close to the target while suspended under a bomber. After disengaging initially in glide, on approaching the target the rocket engine would be ignited and the aircraft accelerated in a dive to about 1,000 mph. This, it was assumed, should be enough to sink any aircraft carrier. A separate unit, Group 711, "Jinrai Butai," was formed, equipped with G4M2c "Issiki Rikko" (Allied code name "Betty) for transport and A6M5 Zero (all. "Zero") fighters for escort.

The Ohka was staffed exclusively by volunteers, graduates of the Yokaren Cadet School, 15-16 years old but already with pilot training (nothing unusual in Japan), and those from high and middle schools. Propaganda immediately took to them, postulating that this was the new "divine wind" that would save Japan. Whoever brought an Ohka to the finish line would become a god himself. Accordingly, the young pilots enjoyed the highest honors, every wish (even cigarettes to young people) was fulfilled.

The MXY-7 was ready in September 1944, but this did not mean that it could be used immediately. First, the future crews had to be familiarized with the flight characteristics at Konoike airfield (sand was installed instead of the bomb). While the "Yokaren" teenagers had completed pilot training (nothing unusual in the Japanese Navy), the other volunteers had to be trained first. The steering characteristics of the "Ohka" were judged to be good, but landing on the skid attached for this purpose was problematic. The MXY-7 was not a glider because of its small wings. The angle of approach had to be precisely maintained and there was only one attempt. Mistakes could mean death.

A further and considerable delay occurred when on 27 October 1944 the new aircraft carrier "Shinano" was sunk by the U.S. submarine "Archerfish" and a few weeks later the carrier Unryu. 138 Ohkas were lost as a result. It was not until March 1945 that a mission was again considered.

On March 21, the timing appeared opportune; a ship aggregation 200 km off Kyushu had been reported. The carriers would have no aircraft on board. For VAdm. Matome Ugaki this was a welcome opportunity to lead the first attack. The subsequent announcement that there were aircraft on board after all did not change his mind. Under a drum roll and a replica of the traditional flag of Mashige Kusonoki from 1336, 3 commando- and 15 G4M2e "Issiki Rikko" bombers loaded with "Ohkas", accompanied by ten remaining A6M5 Zeros of "Jinrai Butai" (Air Group 711) as escorts took off from Kanoya airfield at 11.35, but were soon intercepted by F6F-5 Hellcat of US carriers CV-12 "Hornet" and CVL-24 "Belleau Wood". In 20 minutes it was all over. All the bombers and some escort fighters had been shot down. What followed later was hardly any better. Only six insignificant ships were damaged, the only real success was the sinking of the destroyer DD-733 "Mannert L. Abele" on April 12, 1945 by Saburo Doha, an introverted student teacher. The dead were 375 crew members of the G4M2e carrier aircraft and 55 Ohka pilots. The remaining Ohka volunteers were assigned to conventional "Tokko" missions.

Masakazu Ohta changed his name after the war out of shame at the failure of his idea and the death of so many. Only shortly before his death did he reveal to his son who he really was.

Okinawa, an island of about 100,00 inhabitants located 563 km (304 nm) south of Kyushu, formed the last stop before an invasion of Japan. The Japanese Army - traditional rival of the Navy -, had meanwhile changed its opinion that "Tokko" was a waste of men and material, and now participated with its own units, called "Shimbu". Formations of 300 or more aircraft formed from the Navy and Army, called "Kikusui," consisting of "kamikazes" and escort fighters, were intended to overwhelm American defenses and thus allow more aircraft to get through. As for aircraft types (Army planes often with motivational emblems on the vertical stabilizer), anything that seemed suitable was used, fighters, bombers, torpedo planes, etc... However, it is uncertain whether Tachikava Ki-9 Spruce training biplanes at Kikuchi Airfield, Honshu that were equipped with a gasoline barrel on the rear seat were actually used. Because of their design, however, they would have had a good chance of getting through, since they could hardly be detected by ship radar.

As far as the need for personnel was concerned, voluntariness was now no longer the decisive factor on either side. Everyone knew that other options were out of the question. It was enough to convert a regular squadron into a "Tokko" or "Shimbu" unit, or to make the graduating class of a course into one. In addition, however, there were still genuine volunteers from the high schools and middle schools. They were poorly trained, but they filled the ranks, which was quite calculated, because they, too, kept the American defenses busy.

The airfield of the small town of Chiran in the south of Kyshu became the central departure point. For the overnight stay before the mission flight, flat wooden barracks had been erected on the outskirts between trees, in which rows of futons stood, schoolgirls acted as chambermaids. The photo of them waving goodbye was not posed. They knew what kind of flight it would be. Quite a few of the young pilots wore little dolls on their belts. They had received them from their host parents, who adored and pitied them in equal measure, with best wishes for their flight. The last letters had to be patriotic, as usual, and were subject to censorship.

As for the mission flight itself, the now precarious fuel shortage prohibited complete refueling (the population was called upon to collect pine roots, the sap of which was supplied in liquified form). Each flight was thus a one-way, low-scoring flight. In any case, they first had to pass the widely staggered line of American early warning destroyers (which in their turn became targets of attack, like the legendary DD-724 "Laffey", 14 others were sunk). Then they met the fighter planes of the "Combat Air Patrol" of the carrier fleet. Those that survived this faced a collected barrage of artillery fire on approach to a carrier. The best chance for a hit was to approach lengthwise of the carrier, since there were few guns at the stern, and then hit the deck as steeply as possible. Those who thought they could avoid the planes and, to some extent, the artillery by flying low would end up with only the ship's side in front of them and could do little damage there. Too shallow an approach to the deck also reduced the hit effect. As for planes that crashed vertically into the sea from altitude without apparent cause, either the pilot had already been killed by shrapnel or - as in the case of the A6M Zero - he was no longer able to steer the plane because of too high a rate of descent.

Before impact, one did not call out "Banzai!" at all. It was more common to say "Mother" or the name of another loved one.

With the capture of Okinawa on July 2, 1945 and the withdrawal of the American fleet, the "Kamikaze" attacks also ended. The escort carriers CV-63 "St. Lo", CVE-79 "Ommaney Bay" and CVE-75 "Bismarck Sea" were sunk. Of the fleet carriers, each had been hit at least once (CV-11 "Intrepid" even five times), but the respective damage was limited. CV-3 "Saratoga", CV-13 "Franklin" and CV-17 "Bunker Hill", on the other hand, suffered not only high personnel losses, but also such extensive damage that they were put out of action for the rest of the war. The remaining ships were mostly destroyers of the outpost chain and smaller ones.

On the American side, the losses of war equipment had virtually no impact. There was plenty. What was worrying, however, was the increasing war neuroses as an indirect side effect of this kind of Japanese warfare. Since surrender could no longer be expected, the worst had to be expected if Japan was invaded. The use of the atomic bomb seemed inevitable.

How many "kamikaze" missions were flown cannot be determined with certainty, but a figure of around 2,000 seems realistic. Perhaps the goal, the cease-fire sought by the Tenno and insightful politicians, would indeed have been achieved. But unfortunately, the Soviet Union had been used as a mediator. However, as the declaration of war in violation of the neutrality pact shortly after the dropping of the first atom bomb proves, they had the opposite in mind.

In numbers: "Kamikaze" attacks sank 36 ships and damaged 368. Killed and injured US soldiers nearly 10,000

• August 6, 1945, First atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

• August 8, 1945, Stalin declares war on Japan.

• August 9, 1945, Second atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki.

• August 15, 1945, Tenno Hirohito personally announces Japan's surrender.

• September 2, 1945, Official surrender aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.

After the war ended, no one wanted to hear anything about Tokko/Shimbu. The defeat and the knowledge of the senseless death of many young men hurt too much. In addition, not only Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but all industrial cities had suffered devastating attacks (Tokyo about 100,000 deaths from an incendiary bombing on March 09/10, 1945, see left). Those who had been prevented from flying Tokko or Shimbu by the end of the war, or who had had to abandon the flight because of engine failure or other reasons, remained stubbornly silent. The disappointment that everything had been in vain and the shame of having remained alive were too deep-seated. - But there were also people who rejoiced: Mothers.

VAdm. Matome Ugaki, who refused to accept the surrender, was killed in an unsuccessful "Tokko" attempt. VAdm. Takijiro Onishi committed "seppuku" (vulg.: "hara-kiri") on August 16, 1945. General Hideki Tojo was found guilty of war crimes by an Allied military tribunal and hanged on December 23, 1948. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had already been shot down on April 18, 1943, while flying near Bougainville.